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DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF JUSTICE. By 
Mark H. Moore, Susan Estrich, Daniel McGil/is and William Spelman. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. x, 252. $20. 
Criminal justice scholars have long hypothesized that a small 
number of unusually dangerous offenders is responsible for a substan-
tial percentage of criminal offenses. Drawing on this assumption, pro-
ponents of the theory of selective incapacitation contend that these 
dangerous offenders should be given longer sentences than their of-
fenses would ordinarily warrant. According to the theory, incarcerat-
ing highly active criminals should cause the overall crime rate to fall 
as the total prison population is reduced. 
This theory, originally known as predictive sentencing, has been 
criticized on both practical and moral grounds. Opponents argued 
that the identification methods frequently misidentified people as dan-
gerous offenders. Furthermore, since prediction techniques often in-
volved the use of such characteristics as race or employment history, 
critics contended that the theory was immoral because it proposed 
punishment based on demographic profile rather than individual 
culpability. I 
Recent studies by the Rand Corporation2 that support the hypoth-
esis that the dangerous offender exists have rekindled the debate re-
garding selective incapacitation. Dangerous Offenders: The Elusive 
Target of Justice 3 examines the new data with emphasis on the ethical 
problems inherent in the recent trend toward the use of selective inca-
pacitation policies in the criminal justice system. Dangerous Offenders 
is divided into two parts. Part One discusses the new and old data 
regarding the existence of a highly active and dangerous group of of-
fenders, various methods of identifying members of this group, and the 
justice of advocating harsher punishment on the basis of such identifi-
cation. Part Two examines each stage of the criminal justice system 
from recordkeeping to sentencing in order to determine where a more 
"selective focus" will enhance the efficiency of the system. The au-
thors conclude with a "qualified endorsement" of such policies. 
The studies discussed in Part One conclude that the dangerous of-
1. See generally von Hirsch, Selective Incapacitation, 12 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11 (1983). 
2. J. CHAIKEN, M. CHAIKEN & J. PETERSON, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: SUM· 
MARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1982); P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE IN· 
CAPACITATION (1982); J. ROLPH, J. CHAIKEN & R. HOUCHENS, METHODS FOR EsTIMATING 
THE CRIME RATES OF INDIVIDUALS (1981). 
3. The authors of the book are: Mark H. Moore, Guggenheim Professor of Criminal Justice 
Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Susan R. Es-
trich, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Daniel McGillis, Senior Research Asso-
ciate, Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard University; and William Spelman, Assistant Project 
Director, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. 
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fender, unlike the average criminal, does not specialize in certain types 
of crimes during his career. Rather, these offenders commit crimes 
ranging from victimless petty offenses to crimes involving serious 
physical violence (pp. 42-46). The data also indicate that these offend-
ers commit crimes at extremely high rates - as many as fifty per year 
(p. 38). The authors observe that, significantly, arrest and conviction 
records do not reflect the same pattern and rate of offending. On the 
basis of this observation, they contend that the system is biased in 
favor of dangerous offenders because they are arrested and convicted 
less frequently per offense than the average criminal (pp. 48-49). The 
authors argue that the use of selective incapacitation policies is "essen-
tially just" in order to counteract this bias (p. 67). 
The authors argue that the lack of a reliable definition of danger-
ous offenders has been the most significant stumbling block in past 
attempts to introduce selective incapacitation policies into the criminal 
justice system. The confusion surrounding the identification of the 
dangerous offender is evident in the current use of selective policies. 
The threshold determination of who gets recidivist treatment under 
repeat offender statutes varies markedly from state to state (pp. 53-55). 
To address this disparity, the authors offer a model definition and 
present guidelines outlining the goals and types of variables which 
should be considered in the definition. 
The model definition identifies dangerous offenders as those who 
have (1) at least two convictions for violent offenses within three years; 
(2) two additional arrests or indictments for violent offenses, or two 
convictions for property crimes that involve a serious risk of violence; 
and (3) a juvenile record that includes violent crimes or serious prop-
erty offenses (p. 60). This definition, which excludes such demo-
graphic factors as employment record and drug abuse (p. 60), 
concentrates entirely on the "blameworthy" behavior of the offender, 
thus (the authors contend) avoiding the moral issues raised by other 
predictive sentencing models (pp. 54-58). · 
The authors suggest that the goal in formulating a definition of 
dangerous offenders should be 
to distinguish the guiltiest offenders based on past activity and to punish 
them for their blameworthy conduct rather than to predict which offend-
ers will be most active in the future on the basis of any characteristics 
which aid in prediction, and incapacitate those predicted to be offenders 
for as long as they appear dangerous. [p. 57] 
The authors postulate that a definition will be consistent with conven-
tional notions of justice if it reflects retributivist rather than utilitarian 
concerns. By using the authors' formula, society will presumably be 
identifying offenders who have "clearly revealed their guilt through a 
pattern of criminal activity that merits special attention" (p. 56). 
Unfortunately, the authors' goal of emphasizing retributivist poli-
cies is fundamentally flawed. Implicit in the theory of selective inca-
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pacitation is the assumption that the incapacitation of the offender will 
prevent him from committing more crimes. That is, if society is to 
derive the presumed benefits of selective incapacitation, the definition 
of dangerous offenders must successfully predict which offenders pres-
ent a significant future threat to society. But if, as the authors insist, 
the concept of the dangerous offender is entirely retributivist, then so-
ciety could conceivably (and ethically) target someone for dangerous 
offender treatment who no longer presents a threat to society. The 
authors ignore this problem almost entirely, simply assuming at one 
point that those who have committed many crimes in the past are 
more likely to commit more offenses in the future (p. 56). The authors 
base their entire argument in favor of retributivist goals on this as-
sumption; yet they fail to link the assumption with the empirical data 
presented in such agonizing detail earlier in Part One. By following 
the authors' formula, society would be adopting policies that present a 
serious threat to individual rights without substantial evidence that 
incapacitating these offenders would achieve the desired reduction in 
crime. 
Furthermore, the authors fail to address adequately the profound 
moral questions raised by selective incapacitation. Their definition 
seems to advocate harsher treatment on the basis of unidentified 
crimes which they suppose these dangerous offenders must have com-
mitted at some time in the past. By asserting that the criminal justice 
system is somehow "biased" in favor of dangerous offenders and by 
using this designation to counteract that "bias," the authors tum the 
presumption of innocence on its head, arguing that it is not unfair to 
punish dangerous offenders more severely because they probably 
eluded punishment many times in the past. The presumption of inno-
cence is further undercut by the inclusion of arrests and indictments in 
the formula for determining dangerousness. In response to this objec-
tion, the authors contend that they would not punish offenders for 
presumed past offenses; rather, the definition merely provides a 
method of identifying offenders who will probably be dangerous in the 
future. If this is the case - and it must be, given the discussion of the 
presumed benefits of selective incapacitation (pp. 80-84) - then the 
authors are merely proposing another prediction-type test. However, 
their test is possibly even more objectionable than former models be-
cause the assumption of past, unproven offenses serves as a principal 
basis for harsher treatment. 
Even if the moral and constitutional objections to a sentencing pol-
icy based on predicted misbehavior or retribution for past, unproven 
acts could be overcome, significant practical obstacles would remain. 
First, even using the new studies cited by the authors, a disturbingly 
high number of "false positives" would threaten the effectiveness and 
integrity of any selective incapacitation policy. The authors concede 
that the problem of false positives poses difficulties, but they imply 
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that if a "demanding and stringent threshold" is used the problem can 
be overcome (p. 75). Finally, after several pages of distressed ac-
knowledgement that the problem of false positives remains even in the 
new studies, the book makes the startling assertion that a system of 
selective incapacitation can be just if based on retributive principles· 
despite a "tolerable" number of false positives: 
From the point of view of justice, it would be better to base [selective 
incapacitation policies] exclusively on accurate measures of prior crimi-
nal offending, renouncing all attempts to predict future criminal conduct 
in favor of distinguishing the most dangerous and wicked offenders on 
the basis of past acts. Indeed, only this position can overcome the objec-
tions associated with the fundamental injustice of false positives. If se-
lective policies are seen as retribution for past acts, if the discriminating 
tests are limited to information about criminal conduct, and if the past 
acts have been attributed through appropriate criminal justice proce-
dures, then having some mistaken assignments to the category of danger-
ous offenders is no worse (though also no better) than some mistaken 
convictions for current offenses. In this context a few false positives are 
tolerable. [pp. 78-79] 
In other words, any injustice introduced by new sentencing techniques 
can be excused if it is no worse than existing injustices. The authors 
appear to believe that engrafting new injustices onto existing injustices 
is, to borrow their word, "tolerable." 
Perhaps the moral problems inherent in the theory of selective in-
capacitation could be overlooked if the benefits to society were large 
and certain. Unfortunately, the authors fail miserably in their attempt 
to convince the reader that the possible benefits of selective policies 
outweigh the risks to individual rights. The Rand studies indicate that 
crime could be reduced by more than twenty percent by employing a 
definition using all relevant discriminating factors. The potential ben-
efit if only prior "criminal" activity (including arrests and juvenile 
records) is considered is estimated to be slightly less than twenty per-
cent (pp. 82-84). Certainly these estimates, if accurate, seem impres-
sive. But the assumptions accompanying the estimates are unrealistic. 
The studies assume that these offenders would have committed other 
crimes if they had not been incarcerated - that is, that the identifica-
tion method has accurately predicted future dangerousness (p. 80). 
Second, the studies assume that prison does not accelerate the rate of 
offending upon release (p. 80). Even the authors admit that the practi-
cal benefits may be significantly lower than the Rand estimates. After 
a strained analysis of the benefits of incapacitation, the authors con-
clude that "incapacitation will reduce crime, but less than perfectly" 
(p. 87). Unfortunately, the authors never tell us how imperfectly inca-
pacitation may work. With remarkably little analysis and support, the 
authors simply state: "[W]e think that in aggregate terms the reduc-
tion [in crime] will be small but not insignificant" (p. 87). 
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What may be the most crucial argument in the entire book, that 
the implementation of selective policies will significantly reduce the 
crime rate, is so poorly presented that the reader is left with the im-
pression that the authors are simply trying to brush over a crucial 
point. Unfortunately, the muddled analysis is characteristic of the 
way the authors present a number of their arguments. This reader was 
not surprised to find a mislabeled graph in the middle of this chapter 
(p. 81) - few sections in Part One were without similar sloppiness.4 
With the exception of the development of the definition of danger-
ous offenders, Part One contributes little to the debate regarding selec-
tive incapacitation. However, the unique and useful nature of 
Dangerous Offenders becomes evident in Part Two. Each chapter in 
Part Two analyzes a separate stage of the criminal justice system fo-
cusing attention on selective policies already in use, the potential bene-
fits of further selectivity, and the risks to justice inherent in the 
implementation of such policies. After discussing sentencing, pretrial 
detention, prosecution, police practices, and recordkeeping, the au-
thors conclude that "[t]he potential for practical gains and enhanced 
justice of selective policies is likely to be greater at the front end of the 
criminal justice system [recordkeeping, police practices] than at the 
back end, the sentencing stage, which is already quite selective" (p. 
185). 
The book is most optimistic about the use of selective incapacita-
tion policies in police and prosecution operations (p. 186). Specifi-
cally, it recommends that police pursue post-arrest investigations in 
crimes involving dangerous offenders with greater enthusiasm in order 
to clear up unsolved crimes which are probably attributable to the 
same offender. The authors maintain that if the offender is charged 
with and prosecuted for multiple offenses, society can more easily 
identify the chronic recidivists and sentence them appropriately (p. 
186). In addition, prosecutors are urged to ask for consecutive rather 
than concurrent sentences on the basis of the additional evidence pro-
vided by the police (p. 186). These recommendations are consistent 
with the authors' commitment to making sure that the "bias" in favor 
of dangerous offenders is eliminated and that these criminals receive 
the punishment that they "deserve." 
The authors conclude with a "qualified endorsement" of selective 
policies. The principles that "qualify this endorsement are that selec-
tive policies (1) should employ a very narrow definition of dangerous 
offenders, (2) should be viewed as primarily retributivist, and (3) 
"should not be considered a comprehensive solution to the problems 
4. The explanatory paragraph on page 82 for the graph on page 81 states that "[t]he policies 
whose lines are farthest from the origin of this graph are preferable to policies that are closer to 
it." Thus, the paragraph concludes that policy 3 is the most preferable. The line indicating 
policy 3 on the graph on page 81 is the closest to the origin. The graph on page 43 provides an 
example of a similar type of mistake. 
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of the criminal justice system" (pp. 182-83). As pointed out earlier, 
the first two principles do little to protect the inherent threat to indi-
vidual rights posed by the widespread use of selective policies. The 
third principle, however, is possibly the most important message in the 
book - that society must not latch onto one theme in dealing with a 
problem as complex and important as crimiii.al behavior. 
The authors also point out that "selective proposals may enhance 
justice as well as produce practical benefits" (p. 181). The enhance-
ments to justice referred to by the authors are the ability of selective 
policies to compensate for the "bias" in favor of dangerous offenders 
and the improvement of criminal justice decisionmaking to reduce 
"discretion ... in favor of guidelines based on an individual's prior 
criminal conduct" (pp. 181-82). These conclusions sound like the final 
results of a fair and thorough debate on the subject. Unfortunately, 
the debate offered by Dangerous Offenders fails to address completely 
the moral dilemmas and threats to justice created by selective incapac-
itation policies. The balanced discussion promised in the introduction 
simply never materializes. Instead, Dangerous Offenders offers no 
more than a justification for the use of selective policies. The authors 
came to the debate with the outcome already decided.' 
- Elizabeth T. Lear 
